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Abstract 
In this article, I explore the compatibility of inference to the best 
explanation (IBE) with several influential models and accounts of 
scientific explanation. First, I explore the different conceptions of IBE and 
limit my discussion to two: the heuristic conception and the objective 
Bayesian conception. Next, I discuss five models of scientific explanation 
with regard to each model’s compatibility with IBE. I argue that Philip 
Kitcher’s unificationist account supports IBE; Peter Railton’s deductive-
nomological-probabilistic model, Wesley Salmon’s statistical-relevance 
Model, and Bas van Fraassen’s erotetic account are incompatible with 
IBE; and Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical model is merely consistent 
with IBE. In short, many influential models of scientific explanation do 
not support IBE. I end by outlining three possible conclusions to draw: (1) 
either philosophers of science or defenders of IBE have seriously 
misconstrued the concept of explanation, (2) philosophers of science and 
defenders of IBE do not use the term ‘explanation’ univocally, and (3) the 
ampliative conception of IBE, which is compatible with any model of 
scientific explanation, deserves a closer look. 
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Explanationists argue that inference to the best explanation (IBE) is a rational form of 
inference. However, they are rarely concerned with how IBE relates to models and 





theoretical virtues—simplicity, consilience, mathematical elegance, and so on—that 
might be relevant to confirmation. Likewise, philosophers who discuss models of 
scientific explanation typically are not concerned with how or whether a particular model 
can support IBE. 
Why does this matter? For one, explanationists often claim that IBE is ubiquitous 
in ordinary life and essential for scientific reasoning. See, for example, (Thagard [1978]; 
Boyd [1983]; McMullin [1992]; Okasha [2000]; McGrew [2003]; Lipton [2004]; Douven 
[2013]; McCain and Poston [2014], [2018], [2019]; McCain [2015]; Bird [2018]; Cabrera 
[2020]; Schupbach [2018]). Therefore, the philosophical discussion on the nature of 
scientific explanation seems relevant to explanationism. Models of scientific explanation 
purport to tell us about the nature of explanation in science. However, some of these 
models are incompatible with IBE, so explanationists may make enemies out of the 
philosophers who defend these models. Additionally, there are models of scientific 
explanation that support IBE. Explanationists may find allies in those philosophers who 
defend IBE-friendly models of scientific explanation.  
Second, some philosophers affirm the need for an investigation on the intersection 
between IBE and models of scientific explanation. Wesley Salmon ([1989]) and Peter 
Lipton ([2001]), though they disagree on whether IBE is rational, agree that IBE requires 
a substantive account of explanation.1 Frank Cabrera ([2020]) discusses the plentitude 
problem: the objection that IBE is indeterminate because there are plenty of competing 
models of scientific explanation, each with its own merits and demerits.2 
In this paper, I respond to the need for a discussion about IBE and models of 
scientific explanation. I explore some of the most influential models of scientific 
explanation, especially regarding their compatibility with IBE. Specifically, I argue that 
Philip Kitcher’s ([1976]) unificationist account supports IBE. On the other hand, Salmon’s 
([1971]) statistical-relevance model, Peter Railton's ([1978]) deductive-nomological-
probabilistic model, and Bas van Fraassen’s ([1980]) erotetic account are incompatible 
with explanationism. Finally, Salmon's ([1984]) causal-mechanical model, at best, is 
neutral with regard to explanationism—it does not support IBE, but it is compatible with 
IBE. These models and accounts of scientific explanation are among the most influential 
in the field. Each is independently plausible and most of them are featured in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on scientific explanation by James Woodward ([2019]). 
The exception, Railton’s DNP model, was praised by Salmon for being ‘quite possibly the 
best thing written on scientific explanation since Hempel’s “Aspects” essay’ ([1989], p. 
120).  
 
1 See Schupbach and Sprenger ([2011]) for an argument to the contrary: we don’t need an analysis of 
explanation to give an analysis of explanatory power that can support IBE. 
2 Cabrera ([2020]) outlines several possible responses to the plentitude problem that do not require 
investigating the different models of scientific explanation. Even if models of scientific explanation 





If I’m right, many models of scientific explanation are incompatible with IBE. So, 
philosophers of science and explanationists may have a fruitful discussion on explanation. 
Maybe one group has seriously misconstrued explanation and how practicing scientists 
actually use the concept of explanation. Alternatively, perhaps philosophers of science 
and explanationists do not use the term ‘explanation’ univocally.  
The explanationist might object: Why can’t we give an account of IBE that does 
not assume any particular model or account of scientific explanation? Schupbach and 
Sprenger take this approach in giving an account of explanatory power. They claim to 
provide ‘several, more primitive adequacy conditions that […] an analysis of explanatory 
power should satisfy’ ([2011], 107). 
Explanationists may use this kind of approach. However, they may end up with 
adequacy conditions that are incompatible with some of the most influential models of 
scientific explanation. Those already committed to one of these models, therefore, have a 
reason to reject explanationism. Similar points, of course, apply to those who develop and 
defend a particular model of scientific explanation. They should be mindful of whether 
their model is incompatible with IBE. 
In the next section, I begin by exploring different conceptions of IBE. My 
argument will affect only two conceptions of IBE: the heuristic conception and the 
objective Bayesian conception. In section three, I discuss Kitcher's ([1989]) unificationist 
account and argue that it supports IBE. In section four, I explore Railton’s DNP model, 
Salmon’s SR model, and van Fraassen’s erotetic account. I argue that they are all 
incompatible with IBE. In section five, I discuss Salmon’s CM model and argue that it is 
compatible with IBE, but it does not support IBE. I conclude the paper in section six. 
 
2 What is IBE? 
We start our discussion on IBE by outlining several distinctions. First, explanatory 
reasoning is distinct from IBE. The former seems undeniably ubiquitous in science and 
ordinary life. We make judgments about whether a hypothesis explains a body of 
evidence, we compare different hypotheses, and judge some to be better explanations than 
others. Even critics of IBE can affirm that we often reason about explanations (van 
Fraassen [1980]; Salmon [2001a], [2001b]). Indeed, this what a model of scientific 
explanation does; it gives us a set of criteria for what counts as an explanation or for 
evaluating explanations. However, one may ascertain that a hypothesis is the best 
explanation of a body of evidence and resist inferring anything about the truth value or 
probability of that hypothesis. So, IBE cannot be identified with explanatory reasoning. 
At most, IBE should be considered as a species of explanatory reasoning. IBE is a pattern 
of inference starting from the explanatory features of a hypothesis to the truth value or 
likelihood of that hypothesis. 
We should also distinguish between actual and potential explanations. The 





be how IBE works. Otherwise, IBE would be no more useful than the inference from ‘S 
knows that P’ to ‘P is true’. To avoid trivializing IBE in this manner, we distinguish 
between potential and actual explanations. If H potentially explains E, then H fulfills all 
the criteria for being an explanation of E with the possible exception of truth. 
Explanationists generally characterize IBE as a rule of inference that starts from 
the following premises (Harman [1965]; Psillos [2007]; Douven [2013]; McCain and 
Poston [2019]). 
 
1) E is a body of evidence. 
2) Hypothesis H potentially explains E better than any other hypothesis. 
3) H is a sufficiently good potential explanation of E given our background 
information, K.3 
 
What should we infer from these premises? Some explanationists suggest inferring that H 
is true (Harman [1965]; Psillos [2007]; McCain and Poston [2019]). Others suggest 
inferring that we have good reason to believe H or that we are justified in believing H 
(Peirce [1935]; Lycan [1988]; van Fraassen [1989]; Cabrera [2017]).  
Alternatively, we may favor a more fine-grained approach by describing the 
conclusion probabilistically. I will outline the three most widely held conceptions of IBE 
in the literature and how they differ on the conclusion of IBE.4 
The first is what we will call ‘the ampliative conception’, on which IBE is a 
distinctive and ampliative rule of inference based on the virtue of explanatory power. The 
ampliative conception is discussed in (Harman [1965]; Psillos [2007]; van Fraassen 
[1989]; Douven [2013]; Douven and Schupbach [2015]). Generally, defenders of the 
ampliative conception suggest using IBE after Bayesian conditionalization. Thus 
construed, IBE grants probabilistic bonuses to explanatory hypotheses after 
conditionalization on the evidence. Upon learning E, ampliative explanationists conclude 
that the posterior probability of H is greater than P(H|E). 
Second, we have the heuristic conception, wherein IBE plays a heuristic role for 
ordinary epistemic agents to approximate Bayesian reasoning. This conception is 
defended in (McGrew [2003]; Lipton [2004]; Dellsen [2018]). The conclusion of IBE, on 
the heuristic conception, is a statement that approximates the posterior probability of H as 
being equal or close to P(H|E). For example, the heuristic explanationist might say that, 
 
3 There are exceptions to the generality. For example, on C. S. Peirce's ([1935]) classic formulation, E is 
noted to be surprising. Additionally, Douven and Mirabile ([2018]) provide empirical evidence that the 
average person infers the best explanation only when it is significantly better than its competitors. If we 
want to accommodate this finding, (2) should state that H is the best explanatory hypothesis and sufficiently 
better than its competitors. 
4 There are, of course, other accounts that have been proposed recently. For example, Leah Henderson 
([2014]) suggests an account on which IBE emerges from the practices of a Bayesian who adopts constraints 





upon learning E, the posterior probability of H is r ± θ, which is our best approximation 
of P(H|E). 
Finally, we have the objective Bayesian conception of IBE. On this conception, 
IBE fits within an objective Bayesian framework. IBE provides normative constraints on 
the prior probabilities that we use in Bayesian conditionalization. This conception is 
defended in (Weisberg [2009]; Poston [2014]; Climenhaga [2017]). In other words, the 
goodness of H, as a potential explanation of E, provides normative constraints for P(H), 
or P(E|H), or P(E).  
Defenders of the objective Bayesian conception do not always agree on how H’s 
status as a good explanation provides normative constraints on prior probabilities. 
However, an objective Bayesian conception of IBE must say that H’s explanatory 
goodness provides normative constraints on priors that positively contribute to its 
posterior likelihood. That is, the constraints must positively contribute to P(H) or P(E|H), 
or negatively contribute to P(E). Otherwise, the normative constraints from H’s 
explanatory goodness will not help us infer that H is true, nor that it is probable.5 
As we investigate the relationship between IBE and models of scientific 
explanation, we will, for the most part, ignore the ampliative conception. This is because 
the ampliative conception can be easily added as an afterthought to almost any model of 
scientific explanation. Take any model of scientific explanation that provides a set of 
criteria for what counts as a good explanation. The ampliative explanationist can simply 
advise that when a hypothesis meets those criteria for being a good explanation, we should 
give it a probabilistic boost so that its posterior probability is greater than P(H|E). Of 
course, this doesn’t mean models of scientific explanation support the ampliative 
conception. The models permit giving the best explanatory hypotheses post-
conditionalization boosts but do not require it. 
For the rest of this paper, my use of ‘IBE’ excludes the ampliative conception, 
unless specified otherwise. Our targets are the heuristic conception and the objective 
Bayesian conception. These are the versions of IBE that can conflict or cohere with 
models of scientific explanation. Suppose that an overwhelming majority of the models 
say that H is a good explanation of E only if P(E|H) is high. This would put objective 
explanationists and most philosophers of science on the same side. On the other hand, 
perhaps many models of scientific explanation suggest that H’s status as a good potential 
explanation of E tells us nothing about P(E|H). If so, then objective explanationists and 
most philosophers of science would be at odds with one another. Similar points hold for 
the heuristic conception. Suppose a particular model judges H to be the best explanation 
of E. However, our best approximation of P(H|E) is that it’s somewhere between 0.015 ± 
 
5 For example, Huemer ([2009]) suggests using explanatory considerations to help apply the principle of 
indifference. On their view, we don’t infer that H is true or probable based on the fact that it is the best 
explanation of a body of evidence. This means Huemer’s use of explanatory considerations does not 





0.005. In this case, the model suggests that we don’t use explanatory language in a way 
that allows us to infer the best explanations. Thus, the model would be incompatible with 
the heuristic conception.  
To this end, we want to know what models of scientific explanation say about the 
relationship between H’s status as a good explanation of E and the prior probabilities, 
P(H), P(E|H), and P(E). That is, whether the models suggest that, all else being equal, if 
H1 potentially explains E better than H2, then P(E|H1) > P(E|H2), or P(H1) > P(H2), or 
P(E|~H2) > P(E|~H1). Note that explanationists do not always agree on which prior 
probabilities can be affected by explanatory considerations. Some (Okasha [2000]; Poston 
[2014]; Cabrera [2017]) suggest that explanatory considerations can help ascertain P(H) 
and P(E|H). Others (Lipton [2004]; Weisberg [2009]; Schupbach and Sprenger [2011]; 
Henderson [2014]; Climenhaga [2017]) suggest that explanatory considerations can only 
affect P(E|H). Finally, Cabrera ([2017]) claims that explanatory considerations can affect 
P(E|~H)—and, therefore, P(E).6 This is an issue that I will not discuss. When investigating 
whether a particular model of scientific explanation supports IBE, I will inquire into all 
the priors—P(H), P(E|H), and P(E). The reader is then free to draw their own conclusions 
on how well that model supports IBE, based on which view they find most plausible on 
this controversy about priors. 
Finally, note that IBE requires more than a mere positive correlation between good 
explanations and likely explanations. In addition to positive correlation, some 
philosophers argue that explanatory considerations must be more epistemically accessible 
than Bayesian priors (Lipton [2001]; Salmon [2001a], [2001b]; McGrew [2003]). For this 
reason, Lipton ([2004]) distinguishes between the likeliest explanation—the explanation 
that is most probable—and the loveliest explanation—the explanation that grants the most 
understanding. IBE, according to Lipton, moves from the statement that H is the loveliest 
explanation of E, to the statement that H is the likeliest explanation of E. This distinction 
helps ensure that IBE involves a non-trivial inference from the explanatory goodness of 
H to P(H) or P(E|H) is high (or some conclusion like this) and not the other way around. 
Thus, IBE cannot be ubiquitous in ordinary life and science unless loveliness is often more 
epistemically accessible than likeliness. If a model of scientific explanation suggests that 
loveliness is often less epistemically accessible than likelihood, then it is incompatible 
with IBE. 
For precision, I’ll borrow Lipton’s distinction between loveliness and likelihood, 
but with a slight modification. In my usage, where M is a model of scientific explanation, 
H is a lovely potential M explanation of E if and only if H fulfills all the criteria for being 
a good M explanation/explanans of E, with the possible exception of truth. For example, 
 
6 Cabrera ([2017]) claims that ~H can be interpreted as a disjunction of all the alternatives to H. So, 
ascertaining P(E|~H) involves the evaluation of how good (or bad) the other competing hypotheses are in 
comparison to H. Probabilistically, P(E) = P(E|H)P(H) + P(E|~H)P(~H). So, normative constraints on 





H is a lovely potential deductive-nomological (DN) explanation of E if and only if H 
fulfills all the criteria for being a good DN explanation/explanans of E, with the possible 
exception of truth. 
To summarize, a model of scientific explanation supports IBE just in case it entails 
that (1) explanatory loveliness is positively correlated to likelihood and (2) explanatory 
loveliness is more epistemically accessible than probability assignments. If a particular 
model entails that (1) is false or that (2) is false, then it is incompatible with IBE. If a 
particular model is merely consistent with (1) and (2), then it is compatible with IBE but 
does not support IBE. 
 
3 An Account that Supports IBE: Kitcher’s Unificationist Account 
In this section, I argue that Kitcher’s unificationist account of explanation supports IBE. 
If H is a lovely potential unifying explanation of E, P(E|H) is high. Arguably, P(H) is also 
high, but any general argument we make for the conclusion that P(H) is high will also 
make P(E) high. The two values, therefore, may offset one another. Furthermore, I argue 
that unification is a feature of hypotheses that is often more epistemically accessible than 
prior probabilities.  
The unificationist account starts with the intuition that we explain by reducing the 
number of facts that we have to take as brute. Michael Friedman ([1974]) is the first to 
develop and defend a unificationist approach to scientific explanation. However, 
Friedman’s unificationist account suffers from formal difficulties (Kitcher [1976]). 
Consequently, Kitcher’s ([1989]) is considered the best version of the unificationist 
account and it is the version that we will use. 
First, we’ll introduce the basic concepts Kitcher uses in the unificationist account. 
A schematic sentence is ‘an expression obtained by replacing some, but not necessarily 
all, the non-logical expressions occurring in a sentence with dummy letters’ ([1989], p. 
432). A set of filling instructions for a schematic sentence tells us how the dummy letters 
in the sentence should be replaced. A schematic argument is a set of schematic sentences 
and a classification for a schematic argument tells us the ‘inferential characteristics’ of the 
set—which sentences are premises, which sentences are inferred from which, and so on 
A general argument pattern is an ordered triple consisting of ‘a schematic argument, a set 
of sets of filling instructions, and a classification for the schematic argument’ (Kitcher 
[1989], p. 432). We use schematic arguments to unify our body of accepted scientific 
knowledge, K. A schematic argument unifies K to the extent that it can derive large parts 
of K when properly filled according to the instructions. 
An example might help to illustrate the intuition behind Kitcher’s unificationist 
account. We may interpret Newtonian mechanics as providing argument patterns. The 
schematic premises can be filled with information about the masses, initial positions, 
velocities, or accelerations of various objects. The schematic conclusion can be filled with 





When these patterns are applied to the planets, we have a particular derivation, say, from 
a set of initial positions and velocities of the planets to their final positions and velocities. 
When Newtonian mechanics is applied to falling objects on earth, we have a different 
derivation. But these different derivations instantiate the same argument pattern provided 
by Newtonian mechanics. Thus, they are unified—and, therefore, explained—by 
Newtonian mechanics. 
First, let’s note that unification seems to be the kind of feature that we can discern 
apart from probability assignments. We have done exactly that with the example of 
Newtonian mechanics. We’ve judged that Newtonian mechanics is a unifying explanation 
without evaluating its prior probability and the prior probability of the phenomena it 
unifies. We’ve noted that we can use Newtonian mechanics to derive various phenomena, 
but we have not given even an estimate of the conditional probability of the phenomena. 
So, in terms of making explanatory loveliness more accessible than probability 
assignments, the unificationist account is on the right track.  
Now we want to know whether explanatory loveliness is correlated to likeliness 
on the unificationist account. Suppose H is a lovely potential unifying explanation of E. 
That means H fulfills all the criteria for being a unifying explanation of E, with the 
possible exception of being true. What can we say about P(H), P(E), and P(E|H)? Before 
we answer this, we must determine what H and E correspond to in Kitcher’s unificationist 
account. Note that H and E cannot correspond to the different parts of an argument pattern. 
If they do, then H would be the ordered triple consisting of the schematic premises, the 
filling instructions for the schematic premises, and the classification for the schematic 
premises. E, the unificationist explanandum, would be the ordered triple consisting of the 
schematic conclusions, the filling instructions for the schematic conclusions, and the 
classification for the schematic conclusions. However, schematic sentences do not have 
truth values unless they are tautologous or contradictory. Likewise, filling instructions do 
not have truth values as they are imperatives. For these reasons, we cannot assign values 
to P(H) and P(E). P(E|H) is also difficult to ascertain. If the schematic conclusion follows 
deductively from the schematic premises, then we might make some progress towards 
ascertaining P(E|H). The filling instructions, however, still present a problem for 
ascertaining P(E|H). For similar reasons, H cannot be the schematic premises and E the 
schematic conclusion. Before they are filled, they have no semantic content and, therefore, 
no truth value. 
The other option is to interpret particular derivations, that is, instantiations of 
argument patterns, as explanations. So, let’s suppose H is a set of schematic premises that 
we have filled properly according to the instructions and E is the corresponding filled 
schematic conclusion. Now, Kitcher defends the high-probability requirement—the thesis 
that explanations must have explanans that make their explananda highly probable. 





448).7 Thus, where H is a unifying explanation of E, P(E|H) is high. Furthermore, if H is 
a set of premises that constitute a good argument for E, then P(E|H) > P(E). This makes 
Kitcher’s unificationist account suitable for supporting IBE. Kitcher’s account of 
explanatory goodness entails that a good explanation makes the explanandum probable 
and is confirmed by the explanandum. 
However, this should not be the whole story. What makes the unificationist 
account distinctive is the intuition that particular derivations, in themselves, have little 
explanatory value. A particular derivation is explanatory in virtue of instantiating a 
general argument pattern that unifies many different phenomena. But how should this be 
interpreted in terms of Bayesian priors? McGrew ([2003]) provides two Bayesian 
accounts of consilience that are worth considering.8 First, we have evidential consilience. 
On this picture, a hypothesis is consilient to the extent that it confers high probability on 
a conjunction of evidence, where the individual pieces of evidence are independent apart 
from the hypothesis. Suppose we have a set of evidence, E1 through En and D1 through 
Dn. E1 through En are independent while D1 through Dn are positively relevant to one 
another. That is, P(E1 & … & En) = P(E1) × … × P(En) and P(D1 & … & Dn) > P(D1) × 
… × P(Dn). Suppose that a hypothesis, H, is such that P(E1 & … & En|H) = P(D1 & … & 
Dn|H) and, for any k, P(Ek|H) = P(Dk|H). In this case, H exhibits evidential consilience 
with regard to E1 through En, but not with regard to D1 through Dn.  
Evidential consilience supports IBE. Given the assumptions listed above, it 
follows that 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸1& … & 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛|𝐻𝐻)
𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸1& … & 𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛)
>
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷1& … & 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛|𝐻𝐻)
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷1& … & 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛)
 
 
Thus, by straightforward application of Bayes’ Theorem, it follows that P(H|E1 & … & 
En) > P(H|D1 & … & Dn). If H is evidentially consilient with regard to E1 through En but 
not D1 through Dn, then E1 through En confirms H to a greater degree than D1 through Dn 
confirms H (McGrew [2003], p. 562). 
The second account is theoretical consilience. This has to do with a hypothesis’ 
ability to make different pieces of evidence, E1 through En, positively relevant to one 
another. In other words, H is theoretically consilient with regard to E1 through En if P(E1 
& … & En|H) > P(E1|H) × … × P(En|H). 
Evidential consilience and unification are very similar concepts. The best unifying 
explanations allow us to derive large and seemingly unrelated parts of K. Plausibly, we 
may interpret this to mean that the best unifying explanations make seemingly 
independent parts of K probable. This is exactly what we get from evidential consilience. 
 
7 Kitcher admits, however, that nothing in the unificationist account entails the high-probability requirement. 
8 In an earlier draft of this paper, I addressed only theoretical consilience. I thank an anonymous referee for 





However, evidential consilience and unification are, strictly speaking, distinct. Kitcher 
insists that all explanations are deductive, which sets unification apart from evidential 
consilience. Furthermore, unlike evidential consilience, unification does not require that 
the pieces of evidence unified are independent apart from the unifying hypothesis. 
Theoretical consilience is also distinct from unification. Unlike theoretical 
consilience, unification does not require positive relevance. For example, as mentioned 
above, Newtonian mechanics unifies the motion of the planets and the behaviour of 
objects on earth. Let Hg be a large conjunction of the statement that Newton’s theory of 
gravity is correct and statements describing the state of the planets at t0 and the state of a 
ball in free-fall near the surface of the earth at t0. Let E1 describe the state of the ball at 
some later time, t1, and E2 describe the state of the planets at t1. On Kitcher’s view, Hg 
unifies E1 and E2, because they fit in the same argument pattern. However, Hg is not 
theoretically consilient. Since Newton’s system is deterministic, P(E1 & E2|Hg) = 
P(E1|Hg)P(E2|Hg) = 1, so Hg does not make E1 and E2 positively relevant. However, 
Newtonian mechanics is evidentially consilient in this case since it’s plausible that the 
motion of the planets and the behaviour of objects on earth are independent apart from 
Newtonian mechanics. 
So, unification, evidential consilience, and theoretical consilience are all distinct. 
However, neither theoretical nor evidential consilience is necessary for confirmation. So, 
the unificationist account can make IBE rational even though consilience is distinct from 
unification. Furthermore, even though unification is distinct from evidential consilience, 
the two concepts are deeply similar. Even if some unifying explanations are not 
evidentially consilient, the loveliest unifying explanations often are evidentially 
consilient. 
Next, we should also consider the implications of the unificationist account on the 
priors, P(H) and P(E). If H is a lovely potential unifying explanans of E, then H instantiates 
schematic premises that, when filled according to the proper instructions, describe part of 
K. Thus, P(H) would be high to the extent that we believe most of the statements in K are 
true.9  
However, there is also a challenge. Insofar as E is also part of an instantiation of 
an argument pattern that unifies K, it seems that P(H) and P(E) would rise and fall 
together. If P(H) is high because H fits within a pattern that, when properly filled, 
describes parts of K, then P(E) should also be high. After all, E also fits within a pattern 
that, when properly filled, describes parts of K. This does not mean that P(H) = P(E), nor 
does it mean that P(H) and P(E) increase proportionally.10 
 
9 This approach may fit best with realism about science. This does not seem costly as many philosophers 
who defend IBE do so for the further end of defending realism (Boyd [1983]; Laudan [1984], [1990]; 
Kvanvig [1994]; Day and Botterill [2008]; Psillos [1996], [2009], [2011]) and philosophers who critique 
IBE do so for the further end of defending antirealism (van Fraassen [1980], [1989]; Ladyman et al. [1997]; 
Wray [2008]; Khalifa [2010]). 





So, P(H) and P(E) both increase from being part of a pattern that describes parts 
of K. However, the issue of which value increases more proportionally is 
underdetermined. In other words, H’s being a lovely potential unifying explanation of E 
is compatible with P(H) being greater (or increasing more) than P(E), but also with P(E) 
being greater (or increasing more) than P(H). It’s also compatible with P(H) = P(E) and 
with P(H) increasing to the same extent as P(E). Of course, in a particular context, we may 
have more information about H and E that may settle the issue.11 But if such a case lends 
extra support to IBE, it will come from the extra information that allows us to ascertain 
that P(H) is greater (or increases more) than P(E), not from H’s unifying powers. So, 
Kitcher’s unificationist account supports IBE primarily by making P(E|H) high. 
 In summary, where H is a lovely potential unifying explanation of E, P(E|H) is 
high and greater than P(E). H may or may not be consilient, but it doesn’t need to be 
consilient to be confirmed by the evidence. We may also claim that P(H) and P(E) are 
both high but that, in itself, neither helps nor hinders IBE. Additionally, unification seems 
to be the kind of thing we can ascertain prior to ascertaining Bayesian priors. This makes 
Kitcher’s unificationist account suitable for supporting IBE. 
 
4 Models that are Incompatible with IBE 
In this section, I argue that Peter Railton’s DNP model, Wesley Salmon’s SR model, and 
Bas van Fraassen’s erotetic account are incompatible with IBE. I start with Railton’s 
model because it lies within the familiar Hempelian tradition of interpreting laws as 
essential to scientific explanation. 
 
4.1 Peter Railton’s deductive-nomological-probabilistic (DNP) model 
On Hempel’s models of scientific explanation, nomicity and expectability are individually 
necessary components of scientific explanation. In providing a scientific explanation of 
some event, we show that the event is expectable based on laws. Railton argues, however, 
that sometimes nomicity and expectability come apart. 
Consider the following example, modified from Railton ([1978]). Take a relatively 
short interval of time between t0 and t1. The probability that a particular uranium-238 
(238U) isotope alpha-decayed between t0 and t1 is low. However, we believe, based on 
scientific theory, that spontaneous radioactive decay is governed by laws. On Hempel’s 
view, there is no scientific explanation for why this isotope decayed between t0 and t1. 
That event may be subsumed under laws, but there is no way to make it expectable. Thus, 
it is an inexplicable event. 
Railton rejects this judgment. On their view, nomicity is necessary for explanation 
but expectability is not. On the DNP model, explaining the decay of a particular isotope 
requires providing a deductive argument for the conclusion that it had a certain 
 
11 For instance, if E is a statement that makes precise claims about multiple independent parameters and H 





probability. First, we derive the relevant laws governing the decay of 238U isotopes from 
theory. Second, we state the laws governing alpha decay. It will specify that all 238U 
isotopes have probability r to decay between t0 and t1. Third, we have a statement reporting 
a particular fact, that u is a 238U isotope. These statements constitute the explanans of the 
DNP explanation. The explanandum consists of two parts: first, the derived conclusion 
that u had a probability of r to decay between t0 and t1; second, a ‘parenthetic addendum’ 
(Railton [1978], p. 214) stating that, by chance, u decayed between t0 and t1. Thus, the 
DNP explanation for u’s decay between t0 and t1 preserves Hempel’s nomicity 
requirement, insofar as the DNP explanation subsumes the explanandum under a law. 
However, it does not preserve Hempel’s expectability requirement, as it does not make 
the explanandum—specifically the parenthetic addendum—expectable. 
Railton provides the following defence for their departure from Hempel’s 
expectability requirement. 
 
[The DNP explanation] does not explain why the decay had to take place, nor does 
it explain why the decay could be expected to take place. And a good thing, too: 
there is no had to or could be expected to about the decay to explain—it is not only 
a chance event, but a very improbable one. [The DNP explanation] does explain 
why the decay improbably took place, which is how it did. (Railton [1978], p. 216) 
 
Notice that these claims are not just about when we have explained an event, but also 
about the goodness of a potential explanation. Railton does not merely claim that a 
hypothesis can explain an event without making it probable. In the case of improbable 
radioactive decay, it is a good-making feature of a purported explanation that it makes the 
explanandum improbable. 
So, suppose that H is a conjunction of the following statements: 
 
(1) u is a 238U isotope. 
(2) 238U has a half-life of 4.468 billion years. 
(3) All 238U isotopes have probability of r to decay between t0 and t1. 
 
where r is accurately calculated based on (2). Additionally, E is the statement that u 
decayed between t0 and t1. 
H is a lovely potential DNP explanation of E. In other words, H fulfills all the 
criteria for being a good DNP explanation of E, with the possible exception of truth. This 
means that if H is false—for example, if u is not a 238U isotope—then it fails to actually 
DNP-explain E and, if it is true, then it is a lovely actual DNP explanation of E. Indeed, 
H is a lovely potential DNP explanation of E even though P(E|H) = r, which, given the 
half-life of 238U, is a low value. 
Indeed, if all we know about a hypothesis is that it is a lovely potential DNP 





evidence it purports to explain.12 Thus, the constraints that the DNP model puts on prior 
probabilities are quite minimal and unsuitable for IBE. 
If there are constraints on probability assignments, they would have more to do 
with the features of particular DNP explanations, rather than the DNP model itself. 
Consider a case where we know that u is either a 238U isotope or a hydrogen-2 (2H) isotope. 
Then, we learn E—that u decayed between t0 and t1. In this case, H is a lovely potential 
DNP explanans of E. Furthermore, P(E|H) is greater than both P(E) and P(E|~H). In this 
context, we can infer the lovely potential DNP explanation available. However, we can 
draw the inference only because we have information that goes beyond the fact that H is 
a lovely DNP explanans of E. Namely, that P(E|~H) is much lower than P(E|H). 
There will be other contexts where we cannot infer the loveliest potential DNP 
explanation available. Suppose we start out knowing that u is either a 238U isotope or a 
recently-discovered isotope of type X. Unfortunately, we don’t know the half-life of X 
isotopes. We only know that they are far less stable than 238U isotopes. In this case, P(E|H) 
is significantly lower than P(E|~H). So, H is disconfirmed by E. More precisely, P(H|E) < 
P(H). However, H still meets all the requirements for being a lovely potential DPN 
explanation of E and, if it is true, then it is a lovely actual DNP explanation. In fact, it is 
the loveliest potential DNP explanation available in that context. Since we don’t know 
much about X, we cannot estimate the probability of u decaying between t0 and t1 on the 
hypothesis that it is an X isotope. Thus, we cannot construct a potential DNP explanation 
from the hypothesis that u is an X isotope. 
The examples multiply. Suppose we learn more about X isotopes and manage to 
measure their half-life. Now, we can construct a lovely potential DNP explanation from 
~H. But this does not make H any less lovely as a potential DNP explanation. The result 
is a case where H and ~H are equally lovely potential DNP explanations, but only ~H can 
be inferred. 
All of this suggests that explanatory loveliness, on the DNP model, is not 
correlated to likelihood. There are many cases where a lovely potential DNP explanation 
for a body of evidence is not true, not probable, or is disconfirmed by the evidence. So, 
we conclude that Railton’s DNP model is incompatible with IBE. 
 
4.2 Wesley Salmon’s statistical-relevance (SR) model 
Next up is Salmon’s ([1971]) statistical-relevance (SR) model. I shall argue that, like the 
DNP model, it is incompatible with IBE. Again, the underlying intuition behind the SR 
model starts as a departure from Hempel’s models. Richard Jeffrey ([1969]) provides an 
influential insight to undermine Hempel’s requirement that explanations confer high 
probability on their explananda. Suppose we have a truly stochastic process. Jeffrey 
 
12 If an event that has zero probability cannot happen, then we can infer that the DNP model requires P(E|H) 
to be greater than zero. However, it’s not clear that an event with zero probability cannot happen. Suppose 
u decayed at exactly 12 PM. Plausibly, this event has zero prior probability, yet it happened. Of course, 





claims that as long as we understand the mechanism of the process, as well as the fact that 
it is stochastic, we understand the improbable outcomes of that process just as much as 
we understand its probable outcomes. 
Again, note that Jeffrey’s claim does not merely suggest that there are low-
probability explanations. It suggests that low-probability explanations can produce just as 
much understanding as high-probability explanations. The natural interpretation seems to 
be that explanations that confer low probability to their explananda can be just as good 
and lovely as those that confer high probability.13  
Based on Jeffrey’s argument, Salmon ([1971]) develops the statistical-relevance 
(SR) model as an alternative to Hempel’s inductive-statistical model. On Salmon’s SR 
model, it is statistical relevance, rather than high probability, that holds the key to 
scientific explanation. To provide an SR explanation is to give ‘an assemblage of facts 
statistically relevant to the fact-to-be-explained regardless of the degree of probability that 
results’ (Salmon [1989], p. 67). In this way, Salmon explicitly rejects the Hempelian 
doctrine that an explanation is an argument, as well as the high-probability requirement. 
The explanandum of an SR explanation is a statement of the form, ‘this object, a, 
which belongs to class F, has property G’. The SR explanans for statements of this form 
cites all and only those properties of objects in class F that are statistically relevant to their 
having property G. To do this, we use a partition of class F, C1 to Ck. Relevance is defined 
in terms of the probability of G in each cell of the partition. A partition is relevant to G 
just in case no two cells of the partition yield the same probability for G. In other words, 
P(G|Ci) ≠ P(G|Cj), where i ≠ j. A particular cell is homogeneous with regard to G just in 
case no relevant partition can be made in that cell. A partition is homogeneous when each 
cell in it is homogeneous. 
Thus, the SR explanation for statements of the form, ‘a, which is an F is also G’, 
includes the initial probability, P(G|F) = n; a partition, C1 to Ck, and the probability of G 
in each cell; and the statement that a belongs to cell Cj.14 
So, let H be a lovely potential SR explanans of E. What can we deduce about the 
prior probabilities of H, E, and the conditional probability? Nothing significant for IBE-
purposes. Salmon explicitly claims that we have an SR explanation regardless of the 
resulting probability of the explanandum. In other words, the SR model provides no 
restrictions on P(E|H). It does not need to be high, nor does it need to be higher than 
 
13 Some philosophers also suggest that there is a close relation between explanation and understanding. See, 
for examples, Lipton ([2001b], [2004]); Strevens ([2013]); and McCain ([2015]). 
14 Salmon also uses the screening-off relation to ensure that no irrelevant factors are included in an SR 
explanation. If a factor is screened-off, it is rendered irrelevant. The screening-off relation is defined thus: 
C screens-off A from B, just in case P(B|A&C) = P(B|C). For example, suppose B is the statement that 
Jamie did not get pregnant this month, A is the statement that Jamie has been taking birth control pills 
regularly and C is the statement that Jamie had a hysterectomy last year. In this case, C screens-off A from 
B, because P(B|A&C) = P(B|C), but A does not screen-off C from B. Thus, if Jamie had a hysterectomy last 






P(E).15 In fact, Salmon explicitly claims that negatively relevant factors can also have 
explanatory import in an SR explanation. As long as we have a homogeneous relevant 
partition of the reference class, we would understand all the members of the reference 
class equally well.16 This suggests that not only can H explain E despite P(E|H) being low 
and lower than P(E), H can explain E just as well as a rival hypothesis that makes E 
probable. 
Salmon insists that actual SR explanations have true explanans. Again, however, 
the distinction between potential and actual explanations is relevant. If all we know is that 
H is a lovely potential SR explanans for E, then we cannot infer that H is true, nor that 
P(H) is high. Indeed, there will be plenty of cases where P(H) is low. After all, a lovely 
potential SR explanans consists of all and only those facts that are statistically relevant to 
the explanandum, E. In a scenario where many independent facts are statistically relevant 
to E, H will consist of a long list of facts. This means P(H) is low because, in general, 
informativeness is negatively correlated to likelihood. 
As an illustration, consider the following example, which is modified from one 
that Salmon ([1989]) uses. Suppose Jones has a strep infection and recovers quickly from 
it. Let E be the statement that Jones recovers quickly from a strep infection and let P(E) = 
0.4. Now, we may form a partition to construct an SR explanation of E. Suppose cell C1 
represents strep patients who are treated with penicillin, which increases the probability 
of quick recovery to 0.8. Cell C2 represents strep patients who have underlying medical 
conditions, which decreases the probability of quick recovery to 0.2. 
Now, let’s consider two competing SR hypotheses that purport to explain Jones’ 
quick recovery. First, H1, which provides information about the partition and states that 
Jones belongs in C1. Second, H2, which states that Jones belongs in cell C2 instead of C1, 
but is otherwise identical to H1. Thus, P(E|H1) = 0.8 and P(E|H2) = 0.2. Here is a case 
where H1 and H2 are equally lovely potential SR explanations of Jones’ quick recovery. 
Each of them fulfills all the criteria for being a lovely SR explanation of E, with the 
possible exception of truth. However, by Bayes’ Theorem, we can only infer H1. Despite 
being a lovely potential SR explanation, H2 is disconfirmed by Jones’ recovery, because 
P(E|H2) < P(E). 
In summary, accepting the SR model involves denying that a hypothesis that 
confers high probability to the explanandum is thereby a better explanation than one that 
confers low probability to the explanandum. In other words, it requires denying that 
explanatory loveliness is positively correlated to likelihood. This makes the SR model 
incompatible with IBE. 
 
 
15 Again, the issue of whether events with zero probability can happen is relevant. 
16 Salmon claims that ‘whether the posterior [probability] is higher or lower than the prior [probability] is 
really beside the point’ ([1971], p. 65). The insistence that the posterior probability of the explanandum 
must be higher than the prior comes from the Hempelian tradition of characterizing explanations as 





4.3 Bas van Fraassen’s erotetic account 
Van Fraassen ([1989]) is among the most well-known critics of IBE. Several of their 
objections to IBE are still being discussed 30 years after they were published. See, for 
example, (Kvanvig [1994]; Psillos [1996]; Ladyman et al. [1997]; Okasha [2000]; Wray 
[2008]; Huemer [2009]; Weisberg [2009]; Khalifa [2010]; Douven [2013]; Cabrera 
[2017]). So, why even consider whether their account of explanation is compatible with 
IBE? 
First, van Fraassen's ([1989]) critique of IBE is aimed specifically at the ampliative 
conception of IBE. So, van Fraassen ([1980]) may consistently hold an account of 
explanation that supports the heuristic or objective Bayesian conception of IBE. For this 
reason and the influence of van Fraassen’s account, especially as a representative of 
pragmatic accounts of explanation, we will see whether van Fraassen’s erotetic account 
fits with IBE. 
Van Fraassen’s account of explanation starts with the claim that an explanation is 
an answer to a why-question. A why-question, in turn, consists of several elements. First, 
a why-question has a topic, P1, which is the explanandum—the statement for which we 
seek an explanation. Second, a why-question has a contrast class, X, which is a set 
containing the topic, P1, and a set of alternatives, P2 to Pj. A why-question arises under the 
presupposition that its topic is true and every other member of the contrast class is false. 
Third, a why-question has a tacit relevance relation, R, which specifies the respect in 
which an explanation is sought. These three concepts help us understand the erotetic 
account. Van Fraassen claims that a why-question is a request for an answer, A, which 
bears the relation R to P1 and which probabilistically favors P1 over the other members of 
the contrast class. 
To use a modified version of van Fraassen’s example, consider the question,  
 
Q: Why did Adam eat the apple? 
 
On the erotetic account, Q is ambiguous, for it does not specify a contrast class. Possible 
ways to interpret Q include, 
 
Q1: Why did Adam eat (rather than leave) the apple? 
Q2: Why did Adam eat the apple (rather than the orange)? 
 
Here, we can see that some answers may be adequate for one of these interpretations, but 
not the others. That Adam was hungry may be a good answer for Q1, but not a good answer 
for Q2. 
 Once we have a potential answer that bears the right relevance relation to the topic 
of a why-question, we may evaluate it. On van Fraassen’s view, we evaluate an answer, 






C1) The likelihood of A, given our background information. 
C2) The extent to which A favors the topic, P1, over other members of the 
contrast class. 
C3) Whether there is an alternative answer that performs better than A on (C1) 
and (C2). 
 
Thus, if A is highly probable given our background information, it earns high marks on 
(C1); if A favors P1 over the other members of the contrast class, it earns high marks on 
(C2); if there is no alternative answer, B, that is more probable than A and favors P1 over 
the contrast class to a greater degree, A earns high marks on (C3). 
 This set of criteria can be naturally translated in terms of Bayesian priors. Suppose 
H1 is an answer to a why-question that has E1 as its topic. Suppose also that the contrast 
class has E2 as the only member other than E1. (C1) measures P(H1)—the higher it is, the 
lovelier H1 is as a potential erotetic explanation. (C2) measures the difference between 
P(E1|H1) and P(E1) in comparison to the difference between P(E2|H1) and P(E2).17 In 
probabilistic terms, H1 favors E1 over E2 to the extent that P(E1|H1) − P(E1) > P(E2|H1) − 
P(E2).18 (C3) compares H1 to other potential answers. H1 performs well on that criterion 
if we do not have an alternative answer that outperforms it on (C1) and (C2).  
 We can see how the criteria for evaluating answers cohere with IBE. Recall that, 
on van Fraassen’s view, a why-question arises under the presupposition that exactly one 
member of the contrast class—the topic—is true. So, let’s assume that E1 and E2 are 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive alternatives. It follows that if H1 favors E1 over 
E2, then P(E1|H1) > P(E1).19 By Bayes’ theorem, it will also follow that P(H1|E1) > P(H1). 
Van Fraassen’s erotetic account entails that a good explanation raises the 
probability of the evidence it purports to explain and is thus confirmed by the evidence. 
Indeed, since the degree to which an answer favors the topic is positively correlated to the 
goodness of that answer, the erotetic account entails that explanatory loveliness is 
positively correlated to likelihood. So the erotetic account fits IBE insofar as it makes 
explanatory loveliness positively correlated to likelihood. However, it is incompatible 
 
17 A why-question arises under the presupposition that its topic is true and the other members of the contrast 
class are false, but that does not mean P(E1) = 1 and P(E2) = 0. Van Fraassen ([1980]) claims that when we 
evaluate an answer to a why-question, we don’t use all of our background knowledge. Among other things, 
we set aside our knowledge that the topic is true and the other members of the contrast class are false. 
18 Van Fraassen does not give us a precise definition of the favoring relation. However, van Fraassen claims 
that favoring has to do with how well an answer ‘shifts the mass of the probability function toward [the 
topic]’ (van Fraassen [1980], p. 148). To my knowledge, Thomas Grimes ([1987]) is the first to offer the 
interpretation of the favoring relation that I use here. 
19 Since E1 and E2 are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, P(E1) + P(E2) = 1, and P(E1|H1) + P(E2|H1) 
= 1. By definition, if H1 favors E1 over E2, then P(E1|H1) − P(E1) > P(E2|H1) − P(E2). So, P(E1|H1) − P(E1) > 
(1 − P(E1|H1)) − (1 − P(E1)). So, P(E1|H1) − P(E1) > 1 − P(E1|H1) − 1 + P(E1). So, P(E1|H1) − P(E1) > P(E1) 





with IBE on the issue of epistemic accessibility. On the erotetic account, probability 
assignments are the basis for evaluating explanations. We first ascertain P(H) and whether 
P(E|H) is greater than P(E). We also evaluate the likelihood of H and how well it favors 
E in comparison to rival hypotheses. Using these values, we evaluate H with regard to 
(C1) through (C3) and thereby judge whether H is a lovely potential erotetic explanation 
of E. Thus, according to van Fraassen, the explanationist is wrong about the order of 
inference in explanatory reasoning. We do not start from loveliness and infer likelihood. 
Rather, we start from likelihood and infer loveliness.20 
Admittedly, the explanationist would disagree with van Fraassen and argue that 
explanatory judgments are often more accessible than probability assignments. McGrew’s 
([2003]) card sharp example lends some plausibility to this suggestion.21 Fortunately, our 
conclusion does not depend on whether explanatory judgments are, in fact, often more 
accessible than probability assignments. Regardless of whether it is true or false, van 
Fraassen’s erotetic account is incompatible with IBE. Of course, the epistemic 
accessibility issue is still important and interesting. If McGrew’s example is apt, then van 
Fraassen’s erotetic account is inadequate and explanationists would not be troubled by our 
conclusion that IBE is incompatible with the erotetic account. However, the epistemic 
accessibility issue cannot be adequately addressed in this paper. 
 
5 A Model that is (Merely) Compatible with IBE: Salmon’s Causal-Mechanical 
(CM) Model 
Despite the influence of the SR model, Salmon disowned it in the 1980s in favor of the 
causal-mechanical (CM) model. In this section, I argue that Salmon’s CM model is neutral 
with regard to IBE. On its own, it is compatible with IBE, but it does not support IBE. 
More philosophical work is needed if the explanationist wants to use this model to support 
IBE. At the same time, more philosophical work may reveal that it cannot help the 
explanationist’s project after all. 
The CM model uses several notions related to causality. First, there is the notion 
of a causal process—a process that is capable of transmitting a spatiotemporally 
continuous mark. When two or more causal processes intersect, they sometimes—but not 
always—interact. Salmon provides the example of two intersecting rays of light. At the 
time and place of intersection, the two rays modify one another, but that modification does 
not persist beyond the intersection. This intersection, therefore, does not qualify as a 
causal interaction for Salmon. On the other hand, suppose a ray of light passes through a 
piece of glass and changes its colour. If the colour change persists beyond the intersection 
of the glass and the light, then that intersection constitutes a causal interaction (Salmon 
[1998], p. 72). 
 
20 This is one of Salmon's ([2001a]) objections against IBE. 





Salmon uses these notions to analyse scientific explanations. The explanandum, 
E, in a CM explanation describes an event in terms of the causal process(es) that it 
constitutes. The explanans, H, describes the causal processes and interactions leading up 
to the event described in the explanandum (Salmon [1984], [1998]). 
How well does the CM model support IBE? First, note that causal facts, plausibly, 
are epistemically accessible apart from prior probabilities. They also seem to be decent 
grounds for inferring probability assignments. I can know, for example, that the 
introduction of an invasive species into an ecosystem causes an indigenous species to 
flounder. I can know this even if I don’t know the likelihood of the effect, given the cause. 
Additionally, I can reasonably estimate the likelihood that an indigenous species will 
flounder given that an invasive species has been introduced and my estimate depends, in 
part, on my knowledge that the two are causally related. Thus, I think the CM model 
makes loveliness more epistemically accessible than likelihood. On this issue, the CM 
model fits with IBE. 
However, the CM model does not entail that explanatory loveliness is positively 
correlated to likelihood. On its own, the CM model does not entail any particular position 
on whether causes raise the probability of their effects.22 So, it seems that the CM model 
does not support IBE, but it is also consistent with IBE. 
On Salmon’s ([1998]) own view, causation does not require positive statistical 
relevance. That is, causes do not always raise the probability of their effects. Salmon holds 
this view in opposition to philosophers such as Reichenbach ([1956]) and Suppes ([1970]). 
The following example might lend intuitive support for Salmon’s view. Suppose I have a 
terminal disease. According to my physician, 50% of patients in similar situations as 
myself die from the disease within a month. My physician offers me a treatment that heals 
the disease in 95% of patients, but the treatment kills the other 5% of patients within a 
month. I decide to take the treatment, and I die from the treatment (suppose that death 
from the treatment is easily distinguishable from death by the disease). Intuitively, this is 
a case where taking the treatment caused death, even though it decreased the probability 
of death.23 
Of course, there are ways to save the positive-relevance requirement for causation 
in light of cases like these. For example, much depends on how we describe the effect. 
Taking the treatment decreases the likelihood of death, but increases the likelihood of 
treatment-induced death. Ultimately, whether causes always make their effects more 
likely is an issue that cannot be adequately solved in this paper.24 
What we can say, however, is that the CM model is compatible with IBE but does 
not support IBE. The conjunction of Salmon’s view on probabilistic causation and the CM 
 
22 See Dowe and Noordhof ([2004]); Beebee et al. ([2009]); and Hájek and Hitchcock ([2016]) for book-
length discussions of probability and causation. 
23 Deboran Rosen is considered the first to present this kind of counterexample to the positive relevance 
requirement. 





model is incompatible with IBE. There will be many instances where H is a lovely 
potential CM explanation of E, but P(E|H) is not higher than P(E). However, if the 
explanationist can defend an account of causation where causes raise the probability of 
their effects, they can use the CM model to support IBE. 
 
6 Conclusion 
I’ve explored several models of scientific explanation. Of the models I explored, one (the 
unificationist account) supports IBE, one (the CM model) is compatible with but does not 
support IBE, and the other three (the DNP model, the SR model, and the erotetic account) 
are incompatible with IBE. What can we learn from this? 
Explanationists may argue that IBE-hostile models of scientific explanation are 
inadequate precisely because they are incompatible with IBE. They may also point out 
that some philosophers of science consider IBE to be essential for science. See, for 
example, (Boyd [1983]; McMullin [1984], [1992]; Achinstein [2001]). Ideally, however, 
we want explanationists to tell us why the philosophers of science who endorse IBE are 
right and why those who oppose IBE are wrong. 
Alternatively, perhaps explanationists and philosophers of science do not use the 
term, ‘explanation’, univocally. Cabrera ([2020]) endorses a view like this, claiming that 
in the context of IBE, an explanation, roughly, is a hypothesis that ranks highly in terms 
of the explanatory virtues. This conception may be distinct from the conceptions of 
explanation used outside the context of IBE.25 But if this is the case, then, instead of 
inference to the best explanation, we should discuss something like inference to the best 
unifying explanation or inference to the most explanatorily virtuous explanation. 
However, this strategy of restricting explanatory inferences may come at the cost of 
ubiquity, as there will be contexts in which we use a conception of explanation that is 
incompatible with IBE. 
Finally, we may note that only the heuristic conception and the objective Bayesian 
conception of IBE conflict with various models of explanation. The ampliative 
conception, on the other hand, is compatible with any model of scientific explanation. 
Once H has been judged as a good explanation of E according to a particular model, the 
ampliative explanationist suggests giving H bonus probabilistic points. Thus, the final 
probability of H will be greater than P(H|E).26 
 
25 This suggestion is not unprecedented. Schupbach and Sprenger ([2011]), for example, claim to develop 
an account of explanatory power that is not shared by philosophers of science. 
26 Admittedly, it might be odd to do this with van Fraassen’s erotetic account. We would first judge that A 
is the most probable answer to a why-question and the one that favors the topic to the greatest extent. On 
that basis, we evaluate that A is the best explanation for the topic. Then, following the ampliative 
explanationists’ advice, we further boost the probability of A. Though this is not logically incoherent, it 
seems odd to give a statement a probabilistic boost on the basis that it is the most probable from a group of 
statements. So, perhaps van Fraassen’s erotetic account is the least suitable for pairing with the ampliative 





Among explanationists, the ampliative conception is not as popular as the 
objective Bayesian conception and the heuristic conception. Van Fraassen’s ([1989]) 
argument that ampliative IBE is incompatible with Bayesianism seems to be the main 
reason for this (McGrew [2003]; Huemer [2009]; Weisberg [2009]; Poston [2014]; 
Climenhaga [2017]). But why should explanationists want their view to be consistent with 
Bayesianism? Bayes’ theorem, understood as a theorem of the probability calculus, should 
not be doubted. Bayesianism, however, is the controversial philosophical thesis that one’s 
credence for H, upon learning E, should be equal to P(H|E). It is Bayesianism, rather than 
Bayes’ theorem, that the ampliative explanationist must deny. 
So, perhaps explanationists should not be too afraid to deny Bayesianism. 
Objective Bayesian explanationism and heuristic explanationism may have the virtue of 
being compatible with Bayesianism, but ampliative explanationism has the virtue of being 
compatible with different models of scientific explanation. Furthermore, there are 
promising objections against the Dutch Book argument. Some philosophers argue that the 
Dutch Book argument for Bayesianism is unsound because you can make betting 
decisions based on inconsistent credences that do not guarantee loss (Hájek [2008]; 
Hedden [2013]; Pruss [2020]). Others argue that even if ampliative explanationists are 
subject to Dutch Book losses, there may be other benefits that could justify ampliative 
IBE (Douven [2013]; Douven and Schupbach [2015]; Douven and Wenmackers [2017]). 
If my findings in this paper are accurate, explanationists may have good reason to rally to 
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